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Dinkoff: A Unified Theory of Preemption and Access to Migrant-Worker Camps

NOTES
A UNIFIED THEORY OF PREEMPTION AND
ACCESS TO MIGRANT-WORKER CAMPS
Migrant-worker life remains a silent, desperate struggle for
survival. 1 The wealth of the society fed by migrant labor and the
2
variety of federal programs established to help migrant workers
has not affected this condition. One reason for the ineffectiveness
of these programs is the migrant worker's segregation from society
1. See D. CAVENAUGH, L. LYNCH, S. PORTEOUS & H. GORDON, MIGRANT
CHILD WELFARE 19 (HEW Pub. No. (OHDS) 78-30116, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
MIGRANT CHILD WELFARE]. The migrant worker works an average of 138 days per
year and earns only $2,457. SUBCOMM. ON AGRICULTURAL LABOR OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., FEDERAL AND STATE

STATUTES RELATING TO FARMV.WORKERS 110 (Comm. Print 1976). See generally U.S.
COM I'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEOPLE WHO FOLLOW THE CROPS (1978); Hearings on

Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness Before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker
Powerlessness]; S. REP. No. 1006, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); text accompanying
notes 22-38 infra.
2. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055 (1976), as
amended by Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, Pub. L. No. 95-562, § 4, 92
Stat. 2381; 20 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1976) (teaching children of migrant workers); Comprehensive Employment and Training Programs Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-992 (1976), as
amended by Comprehensive Employment and Training Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-44, 91 Stat. 220, and Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-524, 92 Stat. 1909; 42 U.S.C. § 247d (1976) (migrant health services), as amended by Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 95-83,
§ 303, 91 Stat. 383, and Health Services and Centers Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-626, § 102, 92 Stat. 3551; Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-568, § 9, 92 Stat. 2425 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906)
(amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2861-2865 (1976)). Although the cases refer to the 1976 codification of the migrant-worker assistance programs of the Economic Opportunity Act
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2861-2865 (1976), all subsequent textual and footnote references in
this Note are to the new codification in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906, and are hereinafter
cited as Amended 42 U.S.C. The migrant-worker assistance programs, originally organized as Title III, part B, have been reorganized as Title IV by the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1978 (1978 Amendments), supra. The Senate committee
report accompanying the 1978 Amendments explains the reasons for the reorganization:
Removal of the migrant and seasonal farmworkers programs from the rural
program title to an independent title, is intended to clearly indicate the attention the Committee intends the Director [of the Community Services
Agency] to give to the unique needs and characteristics of rural poverty and
the poverty experienced by migrant and seasonal farmworkers.
S. REP. No. 892, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5403, 5419.
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in camps located on private property. 3 The camp owners frequently deny antipoverty programs access to the migrant-worker
camps, isolating the migrant worker from needed assistance. 4 A
number of organizations funded under Title IV of the Economic
Opportunity Act5 to assist migrant workers have sought court orders to force growers to allow access to the camps. 6 The results
have been mixed 7 because the legal theories advanced by the organizations often have not convinced unwilling courts to expand
traditional legal concepts to resolve this novel problem 8 or to decide the issue on the basis of the equities involved. 9
The supremacy clause 10 doctrine of preemption" provides a
legal theory that justifies permitting access to migrant-worker
3. See text accompanying notes 20 & 21 infra.
4. id.
5. Amended 42 U.S.C., supra note 2, §§ 2901-2906.
6. See, e.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th
Cir. 1975), remanded to 438 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1977), rev'd, 574 F.2d 374 (7th
Cir. 1978); Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971); State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369
(1971).
7. See cases cited note 6 supra.
8. See, e.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374 (7th
Cir. 1978) (narrowly construing Marsh doctrine after Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507 (1976), and summarily rejecting supremacy clause argument); Asociacion de
Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975) (narrowly
construing Marsh doctrine after Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)). Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), held that in certain circumstances it is unconstitutional for a private-property owner to restrict the constitutional rights of those
who are on his or her property. The issue focuses on what circumstances must be
present for the denial of constitutional rights to be state action and therefore subject
to constitutional restraints.
9. See, e.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374 (7th
Cir. 1978); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (reluctant to
rely solely on competing equities, finding additional support in Marsh doctrine and
landlord-tenant law).
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
11. Preemption, as used in this Note, is the invalidation of a state or local statute because it conflicts with federal legislation. Conflict is defined as subordination
by a state of rights and values created by federal legislation to state-created rights
and values. As used in this Note, preemption does not cover the full scope of the supremacy clause, since the separate problem of conflict between a state statute or constitution and the United States Constitution is not addressed. Any preemption analysis presumes that the threshold question whether Congress has the power to act in
the area has been answered in the affirmative. See notes 90 & 152 infra and accompanying text.
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camps. Only three courts have considered the preemption argument in deciding whether to grant access: The argument was accepted by the Southern District of New York,' 2 rejected by the
Seventh Circuit, 13 and accepted in part by the Western District of
Michigan. 14 However, all three cases were decided without apparent analysis of the supremacy clause and with only cursory treatment of the Economic Opportunity Act. This sporadic use of the
preemption doctrine results from several problems. First, the doctrine is poorly defined, and little attention has been paid to unifying, or providing rationales for, its seemingly inconsistent applications. 15 Without a clear standard, the doctrine's scope remains
amorphous. Therefore the issue is frequently not raised in situations where it may be dispositive. Even when an attorney is aware
of the doctrine's relevance, litigation is complicated by the need to
develop standards from a confused body of case law. Consequently,
the decisions are few and inconsistent. Second, there are conceptual difficulties in applying preemption to a migrant-camp context.
Traditional preemption analysis requires that state private-property
rules be preempted when they conflict with federal antipoverty
legislation. The conflict is difficult to conceptualize because the
property rules address interests unrelated to the purposes of the
federal legislation. This contrasts with preemption cases of direct
conflict when state and federal statutes address identical issues, but
compel different results.16 Finally, while more clearly defined legal
doctrines have been available to compel access, the limitations of
these doctrines have only recently become apparent. 17
12. Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60, 61
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
13. Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374, 378-79 (7th
Cir. 1978).
14. Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 622 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (recognizing
right of migrant workers to receive benefits provided by Title !V programs).
15. See, e.g., Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 515; Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground]. But see Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J.
363 (1978), which argues that the Supreme Court's preemption decisions can be organized around a deference to state protection of vital in-state interests. This argument, however, leaves much unanswered. While the Supreme Court has been sensitive to a state's protection of interests left unaddressed or poorly protected by
federal legislation, see notes 85 & 123 infra, this analysis does not provide any guidance for deciding when state protection must yield to federal interests.
16. A state statute is not always preempted when it compels a result contrary to
federal legislation. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware,
414 U.S. 117 (1973). See also notes 86-97 infra and accompanying text.
17. The utility of the Marsh doctrine, see note 8 supra, is severely restricted by
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This Note demonstrates that the preemption doctrine is based
on consistent rationales. From these rationales a paradigm is developed that is sufficiently concrete to be applied by attorneys and
lower courts. Moreover, this paradigm is applicable to the problem
of access to migrant-worker camps for federally funded programs.
The supremacy clause compels such access: It mandates that the
values promoted by federal antipoverty legislation be superior to
state property interests. This constitutional mandate is violated
when state private-property rules are permitted to frustrate the effectiveness of federal antipoverty programs established to assist migrant workers.
BACKGROUND

Title IV of the Economic Opportunity Act' 8 funds community-action programs designed to ameliorate the immediate and long term
problems of migrant workers. These programs include training to
help the migrant cope with technological changes in agricultural
work, child day-care services, legal advice, and housing and sanitation improvement projects. 19 Long work days and a lack of money
and transportation force most migrant workers to live in camps located on the grower's land and prevent them from leaving. Access
to these camps is therefore a necessary precondition to the effectiveness of any migrant-worker program. 20 However, growers fre-

the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). See
text accompanying notes 62-68 infra. Landlord-tenant doctrines are not suitable for
resolving the competing interests involved, and the common law development has
created barriers to its use in a migrant-camp context. See generally Note, First
Amendment and the Problem of Access to Migrant Labor Camps After Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 560, 563-71 (1976); text accompanying notes
69-79 infra. Balancing equities based on traditional limitations on the prerogatives of
private ownership was used effectively in State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369
(1971), but it has been widely ignored. See text accompanying notes 80-84 infra.
18. Amended 42 U.S.C., supra note 2, §§ 2901-2906.
19. Id. § 2902.
20. Migrant Legal Action Program, Access 1 (1970), reprinted in Hearings on
Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness, supra note 1, at 5255, 5255. See
also Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130, 132-33
(3d Cir. 1975); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D. Ind. 1972);
DuFresne & McDonnell, The Migrant Labor Camps: Enclaves of Isolation in Our
Midst, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 279-85 (1971); Note, Laws and Legislation Providing for the Housing of Migrant Agricultural Workers, 6 WiLLAMETTE L.J. 111
(1970). But see Velez v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250, 1251-54 (D. Conn. 1974) (degree
of isolation appeared minimal).
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quently deny access by erecting high fences, hiring guards, and de21
manding that states enforce their criminal-trespass statutes.
The migrant worker's overwhelming need for assistance is undeniable. Then-Senator Walter Mondale described the migrant
camp as "a microcosm of nearly every social ill, every injustice,
and everything shameful in our society: poverty almost beyond belief, rampant disease and malnutrition, racism, filth and squalor,
pitiful children drained of pride and hope, exploitation and powerlessness." 2 2 While conditions have dramatically improved in some
camps since Senator Mondale's observations in 1969,23 conditions
elsewhere remain archaic and brutal. In North Carolina and
Florida, for example, migrant-farmworker crew leaders recently
were convicted for slavery. 24 Housing remains a problem in a number of camps. Sleeping quarters range from air-conditioned mobile
homes 25 to converted chicken coops, 2 6 large block bunkers with
bare, concrete floors, and frame outbuildings with large holes in
the floor and walls. 2 7 Families of six or more are forced to live in
nine-feet-by-nine-feet rooms with two beds, and, in some camps,
single men are housed with migrant families. 28 While some camps
provide gas ranges and refrigerators, 2 9 in other camps families cook
on open fires built on dirt floors in their rooms. 30 The housing
frequently contains neither running water nor toilet facilities, 31 and
some families are forced to live in cars parked along the roadside
,without access to water for bathing or sanitation. 3 2 These serious
housing problems are exacerbated when temperatures in northern
21. Migrant Legal Action Program, Access 10-12 (1970), reprinted in Hearings
on Migrant and Seasonal FarmworkerPowerlessness, supra note 1, at 5255, 5264-66;
Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130, 132-33 (3d
Cir. 1975); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833, 835-37 (S.D. Ind. 1972);
DuFresne & McDonnell, supra note 20, at 284-86.
22. Hearings on Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness, supra note
1, at 4979, 4979 (statement of Sen. Mondale).
23. Things Are Different for Migrant Workers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Apr. 28, 1975, at 54, 54-56.
24. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1977, at 18, col. 6; id., Aug. 29, 1977, at 1, col. 4, at 23,
col. 1.
25. Things Are Different for Migrant Workers, supra note 23, at 55.
26. Note, supra note 20, at 113.
27. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1977, at 1, col. 4, at 23, col. 1. See also MIGRANT
CHILD WELFARE, supra note 1, at 136.

28. Note, supra note 20, at 113.
29. Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
30.

MIGRANT CHILD WELFARE, supra note 1, at 136.

31. Id.; Note, supra note 20, at 113.
32.

MIGRANT CHILD WELFARE, supra note 1, at 201.
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camps drop below freezing at night. 33 The lack of child-care services often forces children to work in the fields. 3 4 Malnutrition
among migrant children is ten times the national average. 3 5 The
severity of the migrant workers' condition is reflected in their short
life expectancy. The life expectancy of the average American is
72.8 years, 36 that of a migrant worker only forty-nine 3 7 ---the average life expectancy for the country as a whole in 1901.38
Means of Compelling Access
The ineffectiveness of alternative doctrines as tools for compelling access to migrant-worker camps illustrates the need for a
preemption argument.
The Marsh Doctrine Before and After Hudgens v. NLRB. 39Until recently, courts found that by denying access, growers deny
first amendment rights of free speech and association. 4 0 The Supreme Court's 1946 decision in Marsh v. Alabama4 1 provided the
4
rationale for satisfying the threshold state-action requirement. 1
Marsh held that a town built and maintained on private property
by the Gulf Shipbuilding Company for Gulf's employees could not
exclude Jehovah's Witnesses seeking to proselytize in the town's
33.

Id.; Note, supra note 20, at 113.
MIGRANT CHILD WELFARE, supra note 1, at 20. If child care services are
unavailable, most children are working in the fields by age four. Id.
35. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 14.
36. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 69 (99th ed. 1978).
37. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 14.
38. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 25 (A Statistical Abstract Supplement 1960) (actual life

34.

expectancy in 1901 was 49.1 years).
39. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
40. See Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir.
1975), remanded to 438 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1977), rev'd, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.
1978); Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73, 80-83 (5th Cir. 1973); Velez v.
Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Conn. 1974); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615,
621-23 (W.D. Mich. 1971); People v. Rewald, 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga County Ct. 1971).
41. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). For an analysis of the Marsh doctrine in the migrantcamp context, see Note, supra note 17; Comment, Constitutional Law-Toward a
Constitutional Right of Access to Migrant Labor Camps, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 972
(1976).
42.

The Marsh doctrine is generally referred to as the "company town doc-

trine," but as the following analysis indicates, this phrase is too restrictive and
misses the essential nature of the doctrine by limiting it to a public-function test. See
text accompanying notes 43-47 infra.
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business district.4' The Court held that the Jehovah's Witnesses
and those who live in the town have first amendment rights that
outweigh the private-property rights of the Gulf Shipbuilding Company." Legal title to the land was not dispositive of the balance
between the competing interests. 5 Instead, the holding was based
on two factors: the public's interest in the free flow of information
is independent of whether the land is privately held; and the Gulf
town is identical to a public municipality. 46 The town had its own
residential housing, business district, sewers, sewage processing
plant, police protection, and post office. In addition, the town's
business district was used regularly by nonresidents. 47 Although
the Court in Marsh engaged in a public-function analysis, i.e., the
extent to which the Gulf town is similar to a public municipality, it
did so to measure the private-property interest that had to be
weighed against first amendment rights. Marsh therefore departs
from the traditional view that state action is a threshold question
resolved without considering the underlying constitutional claim.
Marsh compels courts to evaluate the private landowner's asserted
right not to conform his or her conduct to constitutional standards.
This right is then weighed against the first amendment rights of
the speaker. Marsh held that at some point the private-property
owner's use of his or her land diminishes his or her right not to
conform to constitutional standards and the first amendment rights
take precedence.
What kinds of use constitute sufficient diminution of privateproperty interests was tested in Food Employees Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,4s Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,49 and Hudgens
v. NLRB.50 The utility of the Marsh decision as a tool for allowing
access to migrant-worker camps changed with each case.
The decision in Logan Valley focused on the public-function
problems of Marsh. The Court held that union members have a
first amendment right to picket stores located in a privately owned
shopping center. The Marsh test was interpreted not to require
that property possess every attribute of a public municipality be43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

326 U.S. at 509.
Id.
Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 502-03.
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
407 U.S. 551 (1972).
424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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fore denial of first amendment rights by property owners will constitute state action and therefore be unconstitutional. 51 The Court
found the private shopping center's similarity to a public municipality's business district sufficient diminution of the landowner's
52
property interest to give the first amendment rights precedence.
Although recognizing that the private-property interest was reduced by the public-function attributes of the land, the Court focused on the relationship between the activity of the union
picketers and the property's use. 53 Logan Valley explicitly left open
the question whether first amendment rights will overcome private-property interests if the first amendment activity is unrelated
54
to the landowner's use of the property.
The Court in Lloyd addressed this question in the context of
whether distribution of antiwar leaflets in a shopping center is protected by the first amendment. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, 55 holding that since the first amendment activity at issue was

unrelated to the uses of the property, 56 the property owners could
57
prohibit distribution of the leaflets.
Courts frequently have granted access to migrant-worker
camps on the basis of Logan Valley's interpretation of Marsh.58
These courts relied on both the liberalized public-function analysis
in Logan Valley, and the balancing test that is the essence of the
Marsh doctrine. 59 However, since Marsh and Logan Valley are often read only as public-function cases concerned only with the
extent to which private property has public attributes, the Lloyd
holding-that first amendment activity must be related to the use
51. 391 U.S. at 325. Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion in Marsh,
vigorously dissented in Logan Valley on the ground that Marsh was only intended to
reach property possessing every attribute of the Marsh town. Id. at 330-33 (Black, J.,
dissenting). However, he was simply drawing the line at a different point than the
majority. He did not question the balancing nature of the test.
52. Id. at 318-19.
53. Id. at 319-20.
54. Id. at 320 n.9.
55. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), rev'd, 407
U.S. 551 (1972).
56. 407 U.S. at 564-65.
57. Id. at 570. The availability of alternative means of communication, although
discussed in Lloyd, id. at 566-67, was not an independent ground for the decision. It
was used only as an indicator of whether the first amendment activity bore a sufficiently close relation to the uses of the property.
58. See, e.g., Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 621-23 (W.D. Mich. 1971);
People v. Rewald, 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga County Ct. 1971).
59. See text following note 47 supra; L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAV 1165-66 (1978).
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of the property to satisfy the state-action requirement--created
confusion about the breadth of the Marsh doctrine and its utility in
a migrant-camp context. 60 Courts and commentators, focusing on
the apparent constriction of the public-function test in Lloyd, interpreted this decision as narrowing the balancing aspects of the
Marsh doctrine. 61 While a number of courts continued to grant access to migrant camps after Lloyd, 6 2 Hudgens v. NLRB appears to
have ended the Marsh doctrine's utility in the migrant-camp context.
Hudgens, which involved facts virtually identical to those in
Logan Valley, 6 3 held that the existence of a first amendment right
cannot depend on the content of the speech, 64 i.e., whether the
first amendment activity is related to the uses of the property. The
Court did not, however, undertake a fresh examination of what factors should be applied to the balance. Instead, it read Marsh as
resting entirely on public-function grounds and concluded that the
similarity between a shopping center and the business district of a
public municipality is insufficient: The Marsh doctrine applies only
to privately owned property that contains every attribute of a pub65
lic municipality.
The rule articulated in Hudgens places most migrant-worker
camps beyond the ambit of Marsh since the camps generally are
not open'to the public and do not provide most of the services that
the Marsh town made available. 66 Courts that granted access to
migrant-worker camps under a Marsh rationale prior to Hudgens
60. See Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130,
136-37 (3d Cir. 1975); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833, 838 (S.D. Ind.
1972) (finding Lloyd had limited Logan Valley and therefore access to migrantworker camps could not be granted on Marsh doctrine rationale); Comment, supra
note 41. But see Note, supra note 17 (concluding that Lloyd still provided best
means for compelling access to migrant-worker camps).
61. See, e.g., Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518
F.2d 130, 136-37 (3d Cir. 1975); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833, 838 (S.D.
Ind. 1972) (finding Lloyd had limited Logan Valley and therefore access to migrantworker camps could not be granted on Marsh doctrine rationale); Comment, supra
note 41.
62. See, e.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th
Cir. 1975); Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73, 80-83 (5th Cir. 1973);
Velez v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Conn. 1974).
63. Compare Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. at 509, with Food Employees Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. at 310-12.
64. 424 U.S. at 520.
65. Id. at 518-20.
66. Compare text accompanying notes 20-34 supra with text accompanying
note 47 supra.
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will no longer do so. 67 Therefore, the isolation and lack of services
that form the basis of the complaints 68 protect the camps from a
finding of state action. The camps' most odious attributes insulate
them from judicial intervention.
Landlord-Tenant.--Courts have granted access to migrantworker camps on the basis of a tenant's right to receive guests.6 9
The threshold determination whether the migrant worker is a tenant or occupies as an incident of employment without the rights of
tenancy 70 may be dispositive of the access question. While the
cases hold that one who occupies incident to employment does not
67.

See, e.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374 (7th

Cir. 1978). The first decision of the Seventh Circuit in Illinois Migrant Council v.
Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975), decided prior to Hudgens, reversed a district court decision dismissing an action brought under § 1983, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976), by a nonprofit organization funded under §§ 2861-2865 of Title 42, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2861-2865 (1976) (amended 1978), that sought injunctive relief from denial
of access by a grower to the migrant-worker camps located on its land. The Seventh
Circuit held that plaintiff's allegations in the complaint showed sufficient state action under Marsh and its progeny. 519 F.2d 391, 396-97 (7th Cir. 1975). On remand,
the district court awarded plaintiff summary judgment and held that defendant's
camp was a company town within the meaning of Marsh. 438 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill.
1977), rev'd, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978). On defendant's appeal from this entry of
summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit reversed on the grounds that Hudgens
controlled and defendant's property did not fall within Hudgens' definition of a company town. 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978). But see Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G
& U, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting access to migrant-camp on
Marsh rationale after Hudgens).
Hudgens is also being narrowly construed outside the migrant-camp context. See,
e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), aff'd, 437 U.S.
556 (1978). In Eastex the Fifthi Circuit, on a petition for a rehearing, modified its decree allowing distribution of union-sponsored circulars on company grounds by
deleting references to first amendment protection in order to conform to the
Hudgens decision. The court let its decree stand on the alternative ground, announced in its original decision, that the union organizers have a right to access under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). See Eastex, Inc.
v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 198 (5th Cir.), modified on rehearing, 556 F'2d 1280 (5th Cir.
1977) (per curiam), aff'd, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). Accord, People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d
529, 349 N.E.2d 832, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976) (no first amendment right to picket supermarket in privately owned shopping center).
68. See sources cited notes 20 & 21 supra.
69. E.g., State v. Fox, 82 Wash. 2d 289, 292-93, 510 P.2d 230, 232 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833, 838-39
(S.D. Ind. 1972); Fogueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 624-25 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
70. Compare Walton v. Darby Town Houses, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa.
1975), with Weisberg v. Cohen, 129 A.D. 496, 114 N.Y.S. 138 (1908), cited with approval in Dobson Factors, Inc. v. Dattory, 80 Misc. 2d 1054, 1055, 364 N.Y.S.2d 723,
724 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975), and State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 306-07, 277 A.2d 369, 374
(1971).
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enjoy tenancy rights, the cases do not address the issue of whether
such a classification also gives landlords the right to limit an occupant's ability to receive invited visitors. 71 The resolution of this issue may turn on whether the source of the right to receive guests
is a tenancy right or a first amendment right of association. 72 In either case, there remains the question whether the right to receive
invited guests affords effective access to the camps.
Since migrants are often unaware of the existence of programs
to assist them, 73 access predicated on invitation is doomed to failure. Even if the migrant is aware that a program exists, he or she
74
often is unable to communicate with those outside the camp.
These problems make solicitation a necessary component of effective access. However, property owners have the right to prohibit
solicitation on their property,7 5 and the prohibitions may not require consent of the tenants. 76 Moreover, the utility of landlordtenant doctrine is further diminished by the holding in some jurisdictions that a tenant can contract away the right to receive certain
guests. 77 These jurisdictions would likely uphold a lease agreement
prohibiting solicitation, since this right is arguably less fundamental
than the right to receive invited guests. However, if the right to
71.

In Walton v. Darby Town Houses, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1975),

the court stated in dicta that someone who occupies as an incident of employment
can be evicted for the exercise of his or her first amendment rights. Id. at 558.
72. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 n.7 (1967) (right of association
specifically protected by first amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (exact basis of holding unclear) (rights of association guaranteed by first
amendment extend beyond associations for political purposes to encompass association of two people in marriage); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va.
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1964) (right of railroad workers to gather together for lawful purpose of helping and advising each other in asserting various statutory rights is
protected by first amendment). There is, however, a threshold requirement of state
action. See text accompanying notes 78 & 79 infra.
73.

GovERNoR's TASK FORCE ON MIGRANT FARM LABOR, REPORT 101-02

(1968), quoted in State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 304-05, 277 A.2d 369, 373 (1971).
74. See State v. Fox, 82 Wash. 2d 289, 291, 510 P.2d 230, 232 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974). The one telephone in the migrant camp was located in
the company office and migrant workers needed permission to use it. Id.
75. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Southerland Dev. Corp. v. Ehrler's Dairy, Inc., 468 S.W.2d 284,
286-87 (Ky. 1971). It is not difficult to imagine the migrantes employment contract
under these circumstances. The court in Southerland, however, narrowly construed
the lease and allowed entry of guests. Id. at 287. For a discussion of the ability of a
municipality to prohibit door-to-door solicitation, see Annot., 48 L. Ed. 2d 917
(1977).
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receive guests is derived from the Constitution, rather than from
the incidents of tenancy, then the tenant may not be able to contract away these rights, and solicitation may be the only effective
means of protecting the occupant's first amendment rights of association. The utility of a first amendment right in this context is
questionable, however, since such a right is only protected from
state action. 7 8 After Hudgens v. NLRB, 79 it is unlikely that a court

will find state action in a private landlord's denial of a tenant's first
amendment rights.
In addition, the landlord-tenant analysis is inadequate because
its underlying rationales do not provide tools for meeting the complex needs and the competing interests involved. Landlord-tenant
doctrines were not developed to remedy the access problems inherent in the migrant workers' unique situation or to facilitate the
work of programs established to help them. These doctrines are silent about how best to balance the needs of migrants against the
private-property rights of the grower.
Balancing the Rights of Migrant Workers Against Private-

Property Rights: State v. Shack. 80-A unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court granted access to a migrant camp on the ground that
"[p]roperty rights serve human values. They are recognized to that
end, and are limited by it." ' The court held that the right of a
property owner to pursue his farming activities without interference does not give him the right to isolate migrant workers, or to
deny or interfere with their right "to live in dignity and to enjoy
associations customary among our citizens." 82 The court continued:
"These rights are too fundamental to be denied on the basis of an
interest in real property and too fragile to be left to the unequal
bargaining strength of the parties."' However, this analysis has
been ignored by all but the most sympathetic courts, and even
they have been reluctant to use it as the sole basis for their decisions. 8 4
78. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 359 (1974). See
generally text accompanying notes 141-151 infra; note 142 infra.
79. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
80. 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
81. Id. at 303, 277 A.2d at 372.
82. Id. at 308, 277 A.2d at 374.
83. Id., 277 A.2d 374-75 (citations omitted).
84. See, e.g., Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (finding
additional support in Marsh doctrine and landlord-tenant law).
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The Advantages of Preemption
The supremacy clause doctrine of preemption avoids the pitfalls of the methods of analysis just discussed. It is a traditional
doctrine that can be applied to the access problem without
straining the doctrine's original rationale. In addition, it provides a
mechanism for resolving the conflict between the interests involved. Although the supremacy clause does not involve a balancing test, it strikes a balance by both ensuring federal supremacy
and protecting state interests.8 5 The doctrine protects state interests by limiting preemption's scope to that which is necessary to
ensure that federally protected values are not subordinated to state
interests. The program's needs, therefore, define the extent of access: Access cannot exceed what is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the federal antipoverty programs. This limitation protects the property rights of the growers from unnecessary
diminution.
85.

This feature of the supremacy clause, together with the clear-statement re-

quirement, see text accompanying notes 165-169 infra, provides the Court precise
and principled tools for protecting the role of the states in the federal system. The
Court's misguided efforts in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
can only produce confusion since the National League of Cities standard is vague
and unworkable. See note 90 infra. The role of preemption in protecting state sovereignty in an era of increasing centralization is illustrated by Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), and cases in the labor dispute area, an area
tightly governed by federal legislation and agency regulations. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978)
(states can enjoin trespass by union picketers even though trespass is arguably protected by National Labor Relations Act). The Sears decision is based on a dual finding that the impact of the federal legislative scheme would be minimal, and, given
the structure of the NLRB grievance procedures, the employer/landowner would be
without effective relief if he or she could not resort to state courts. Id. at 207. See
also Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joinders, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (suit by
union member against union for intentional infliction of emotional harm allowed
on grounds that plaintiff sought relief that NLRB could not award) (minimal possibility of conflict with federal policy noted); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (union's claim that expelled union member's sole remedy is through NLRB rejected on same grounds as those relied on in Farmer);UAW
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956) (NLRA not intended as
exclusive means of controlling union violence and state has right to control such activity) (emphasizing traditional position of states as guardians of public against violence). For cases in a nonlabor context, see, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Oil
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (upholding Ohio trade secrets statute despite federal
patent laws and prior decisions preempting state unfair trade practice statutes);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (within state power to impose higher
penalites for crime defined in federal statute on ground that Congress and Interstate
Commerce Commission intended to give each state option of imposing higher penalties if state believes problem more severe in its jurisdiction).
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UNIFIED THEORY OF PREEMPTION

Inadequate scholarly and judicial attention has been given to
developing a unified approach to preemption problems. Scholarly
comment often concentrates on inconsistencies in judicial decisions 86 and prescribes formulas for future decisionmaking. 8 7 While
many of these prescriptions may be desirable, they have been
widely ignored and are therefore unlikely to be helpful in allowing
access. Judicial decisions have used overly broad language to describe the tests they apply. 88 The resulting confusion restricts the
possible applications of preemption and produces erroneous decisions when courts fall prey to their own broad code words and
overlook the analysis underlying the Supreme Court's decisions. 89
This section develops a paradigm that provides both a rationale
for prior preemption decisions and a framework for using the
preemption doctrine to force courts to grant access to migrantworker camps.
The supremacy clause does not define substantive rights or allocate areas of power between the federal and state systems.9 0 Its
86. E.g., Hirsch, supra note 15. This is not intended to suggest that there have
not been shifts in the Court's attitude towards preemption. These shifts have been
the result of changing views of federalism, Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUtM. L. REv. 623 (1975),
and are inevitable since the supremacy clause is the mediator in our federal system,
see notes 90 & 91 infra and accompanying text. However, the history of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the supremacy clause illustrates an evolving standard that
this Note analyzes.
87. Hirsch, supra note 15; Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note
15.
88. See note 95 infra.
89. The dangers of this broad inquiry are evident in the Court's decision in
Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), overruled, Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). See text accompanying notes 128-140 infra. In Napier
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926), the Court invalidated state regulations aimed at protecting the health and comfort of the railroad's employees and passengers, because of federal regulations' directed at safety, even though the Court
found: (1) There was no physical conflict between the devices required by the state
and those mandated by federal regulation, id. at 610-11; (2) the interference with interstate commerce would be incidental, id. at 612; and (3) there was no congressional
intent to ensure national uniformity, id. at 613. The Court drew an inference of congressional intent to preempt solely from the broad grant of authority by Congress to
the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. at 613. Contra, Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). For discussion of Huron Portland Cement, see
notes 122-127 infra.
90. Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DE
PAuL L. REV. 630, 635 (1972). See also Petro, Federal Pre-emption-A Comment, 33
N.Y.U. L. REv. 691, 694-95 (1958). Professor Petro challenges the presumption that
Congress has unlimited power to legislate and preempt. He raises the specter of a
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primary function is to mediate between concurrent exercises of
power by fifty sovereign states and the federal government. The
supremacy clause dictates the position of the national government
in this federal system. 9 1 Refining this dictate into a workable
standard capable of regulating conflicts inherent in a dynamic balance of power has proven difficult.
Preemption often is divided artificially into three categories :92
(1) When Congress has exercised its power with the intent to exclude all state action in an area, state legislation is preempted even
if there is no direct conflict; 93 (2) when the subject of federal legiswithered state system and an omnipresent national government. This analysis has
been legitimized by the Supreme Court's recent decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which held that there is a limit to Congress' power
to legislate under the commerce clause at the expense of the states. This decision is
internally inconsistent, since the Court held that Congress' power under the commerce clause is plenary, but the federal statute was invalid because it "would impair
the States' 'ability to function effectively in a federal system.'" Id. at 852 (quoting
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). The Court never explained how a
power within the enumerated powers of Congress can be also reserved for the states
in light of the tenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. X, which provides, in pertinent part: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution ...
are reserved to the States .... National League of Cities was the first case since
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), to invalidate federal legislation as exceeding the enumerated powers of the federal government when Congress had
relied on its powers under the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
91. It has been hypothesized that if the Constitution had not specifically stated
that the laws of the federal government are supreme, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, this
would have been implied from the creation of a national government. See McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); THE FEDERALIST
No. 33, at 157-58 (A. Hamilton) (Everyman ed. 1911); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION § 1831, at 693 (1833).

92. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-42 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947); Hirsch, supra note 15, at 516; Comment, Preemption
Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Unified Method of Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 197, 199-208, 214-17 (1978); Note, supra note 15, at 363 (divides possible relationships betveen federal and state statutes into express preemption, express savings, prohibition of dutiful conduct, and hindrance).
93. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163-68 (1978);
Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348
U.S. 61 (1954); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 233-36 (1947). Several
labor cases have dealt with whether states can exercise concurrent power with the
NLRB or whether Congress intended the NLRB's jurisdiction to be exclusive. See,
e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959); San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957); Meat Cutters Local 427
v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1957); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,
353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957). It has been argued that the need for national uniformity in
the regulation of labor relations mandates a broad application of preemption. Cox &
Seidman, Federalismand Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211 (1950).
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lation is traditionally the exclusive concern of the federal government, state regulation is preempted; 94 and (3) when neither the
subject matter nor the legislation indicates an intent to preclude all
state action, the state is permitted to address problems in the area
covered by the federal legislation if enforcement of the state statute
does not conflict with the federal legislation. 95 Federal antipoverty
legislation faills into the latter category.
But delineating three categories masks the underlying unity of
preemption. The delineation primarily results from a focus on the
language rather than the facts of the cases or the underlying rationales of the decisions. The danger of the categories is that they imply a checklist approach to preemption analysis9" inappropriate
94.

See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (Pennsylvania statute im-

posing registration requirements on aliens residing within Commonwealth invalid);
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (California statute imposing added restrictions on immigrants entering United States through California ports invalid despite
absence of conflicting federal law).
95. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974) (state
enforcement of trade secrets statute upheld, since copyright and patent clause of
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is not grant of exclusive power to national
government; states free to encourage invention as long as legislation does not "conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress"); Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-43 (1963) (United States Department of Agriculture ripeness standards not intended to establish uniform tests; states
therefore free to adopt their own standards); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949)
(states permitted to impose penalties on federally defined crimes that are higher than
federal penalties, because federal statute contemplated that problem might be more
serious in some states than in others); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202,
207-09 (1944) (federal licensing of customhouse broker does not exempt brokerage
house from state statute requiring foreign corporations to obtain certificate of authority as precondition to bringing suit in state court); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
350-52, 358 (1943) (California agricultural policy sustained even though some of its
goals conflict with federal agricultural policy since federal statute encourages state
programs and California had not acted contrary to federal policy). Compare
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 117, 132-34 (1913) (struck down state statute
requiring labels as inconsistent with federal labeling requirements because opportunity for federal inspection occurs only after goods leave interstate commerce and
states cannot require destruction of evidence federal government needs to ensure
compliance), with Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 532-35 (1912) (state statute requiring
disclosure of ingredients in feeding stuffs for domestic animals upheld, because
Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, does not apply to disclosure or
nondisclosure of ingredients).
Other language used by the Supreme Court to describe the conflict test indicates
a state statute will be struck down if "contrary to," "repugnant to," "irreconcilable
with," "inconsistent with," "in violation of," "interferes with," or "curtails" the
"purpose of" federal legislation. These phrases are included in Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (footnote omitted).
96. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141
(1963).
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given the complexities of the problem and its implications for the
states.
The inquiry in all three categories is whether the values created by the federal legislation are subordinated by enforcement of
the state statute. Preemption in the first category is premised on a
finding that federal legislation is designed to ensure a nationally
uniform standard or policy. 97 State regulation therefore undermines the uniformity value, irrespective of the degree of actual
conflict. Even when state statutes are automatically preempted
because they attempt to regulate an area in which the national
government traditionally exercises exclusive jurisdiction, 98 the
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to allow concurrent
exercises of state power if none of the reasons for exclusive federal
jurisdiction are implicated.9 9 Therefore, although the Court has
preempted state statutes that impose burdens on aliens because
the adverse consequences for American foreign policy would affect
every state,1 0 0 the Court recently upheld a California statute
regulating the employment of illegal aliens. 10 1 The Court distinguished its prior holdings-that states cannot regulate aliens-by
noting that the California statute protects the rights of legal aliens,
rather than adding to their burdens.1 0 2 Therefore, no adverse for97. See cases cited note 93 supra. Conversely, the courts have specifically relied
on a finding that Congress did not intend national uniformity in upholding concurrent exercise of state police power. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 136 (1973); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1949);
British Airway Bd. v. Port Authority, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977). In Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 145-47 (1963), the Court allowed
California to apply a ripeness test for avocados different from that adopted by the
Department of Agriculture. The federal regulation in Paul was drafted by a group of
private Florida growers and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture; a fact that may
have precluded a finding that national uniformity was a goal. See L. TIuBE, supra
note 59, at 383-84 (result in Paul is based on method by which federal regulation
was drafted). See generally Note, The Concorde and Local Control of Airport Noise:
Federal Preemption?, 13 NEw ENG. L. REv. 473 (1978). The major problem in this
area is defining the scope of federal preemption. The inquiry has been whether enforcement of the state regulation would subordinate the congressional goal of uniformity. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joinders, 430
U.S. 290 (1977); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958);
UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
98. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
100. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63-65 (1941).
101. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
102. Id. at 358 n.6. Furthermore, California did not seek, as it had in Chy Lung
v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876), to regulate immigration or impose burdens on those
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eign policy consequences flow from enforcement of the California
statute. In the third category, the inquiry is also into the values
created by the federal legislation and the degree to which they are
subordinated by enforcement of the state statute. However, in this
category the values are more numerous and must be carefully
identified.
Preemption questions are usually addressed in terms of "purpose" and "conflict," not "values" and "subordination." A "values"
test is preferable to the traditional "purposes" test because it focuses the inquiry in a way which the purposes test does not. The
stated purpose of a statute is often overly broad. For example, the
National Labor Relations Act's' 0 3 statement of purpose is a sweeping assertion of the benefits of collective bargaining and the need
to encourage it. 104 The value of national uniformity was discovered
only after detailed examination of its provisions and legislative history. 10 5 Congress rarely addresses the federalism or preemption
implications of its legislation. 10 6 Focusing on values avoids looking
for nonexistent statements of intent to preempt or to occupy the
field. It focuses a court's examination of legislation on ascertaining
what problems the legislation addresses, what factors motivated enactment of the legislation, what goals the legislation seeks to
achieve, and how the legislation attempts to achieve its goals. This
analysis enables a court to accurately evaluate the impact of a state
statute on federal legislation.
More important than the distinction between values and purpose is the focus on "subordination" rather than "conflict"-or the
other broad code words used by the Supreme Court to describe its
preemption test. "Conflict" describes a broad range of interplay between state and federal legislation, only some of which gives rise to
preemption. 10 7 "Subordination," on the other hand, indicates the
entering the country through California ports. Regulations of this type have obvious

consequences for United States foreign relations and redress would be sought
against the Nation as a whole, not just California. Id. at 279-80.
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
104. Id. § 151.
105. See, e.g., Guss-v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). See generally Northern States Power v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem.,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (method of analysis similar to that in Guss used to decide
whether Minnesota could exercise concurrent authority with Atomic Energy Commission over radioactive materials).

106. See Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note 15, at 209-10;
Hirsch, supra note 15, at 542-48 (even when Congress does address issue, discussion
is often imprecise).
107. Compare Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S.
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kinds of interplay that violate the supremacy clause. It accomplishes this by providing a standard more sensitive to preemption
concerns. Preemption's core function is to maintain the national
government's superiority and integrity from the undertow of local
interests. Therefore, preemption is concerned with particular types
of conflict: those in which enforcement of state policy undermines
federal values. Conflict in objectives is irrelevant, as is dissimilar
purpose. Instead, the focus is whether enforcement of a state statute subordinates federally protected values to ones that a state may
consider more important. In the migrant-camp context the inquiry
is whether enforcement of state private-property rules makes those
values superior to values underlying federal antipoverty legislation.
It is generally accepted that a statute is an invalid exercise of
state police power and conflicts with federal legislation if it either
requires something that federal law prohibits, 10 8 or provides for
state decisionmaking about matters committed to federal discretion.' 0 9 The Supreme Court, however, recently upheld a California
117 (1973) (sustaining California statute that invalidates mandatory arbitration clause
required by New York Stock Exchange rules promulgated pursuant to section 6 of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976)), and Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (sustaining state statute that established different test for avocado ripeness from that adopted by U.S. Department of
Agriculture), and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (California agricultural policy
enforced even though its goals were at odds with federal agricultural policy), with
cases cited note 108 infra.
108. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972) (invalidating state
statute defining absent parent for purposes of Aid to Families with Dependent Children as not including serviceman stationed away from home, contradicting Social Security Act); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (invalidating attempt by Florida to enjoin nonlawyer licensed to practice before United States
Patent Office from preparing or prosecuting patent applications before Patent Office
on grounds that this constitutes practice of law without license); Davis v. Elmira Say.
Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (1896) (invalidating state law which required that bankrupt national bank give priority to deposits of other banks, because federal statute required
that all depositors be treated equally in receiving their pro rata share).
109. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 175-78 (1978) (United
States Secretary of Transportation was given authority to balance competing factors
in setting weight and speed limits for ocean tankers, and states cannot impose higher
standards); Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956) (Arkansas may not
subject contractor bidding for federal job to state determination of whether he meets
minimum criteria, since federal statute requires federal government to make similar
determinations when deciding whether to accept bid). In Leslie Miller, Inc. it was irrelevant to the Court's decision that the state criteria were harmonious with, and
substantially similar to, the federal standards. The dispositive factor was the state's
ability to exercise its police power to veto a decision made by the federal government. Id. at 190. In First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328
U.S. 152 (1946), the Court refused to sustain a state licensing provision, even though
the Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), as amended by Public Utility
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statute that invalidated mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts even though the arbitration clause at issue was
mandated by regulations issued pursuant to a federal statute.110
The regulation requiring the arbitration clause was promulgated by
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) pursuant to section 6 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)."' The regulation
provided that a dispute between a member of the NYSE and one
of the member's employees must be subject to arbitration at the
request of either party. The Court based its decision in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware"x2 on a finding that
none of the values that the federal legislation seeks to protect
would be undermined'by sustaining California's invalidation of the
arbitration clause. Specifically, the Court found that the 1934 Act
was designed "to insure fair dealing and to protect investors from
harmful or unfair trading practices." 1 3 The Court reached this conclusion after examining the federal supervision provided for in the
1934 Act over the otherwise independent exchanges. The Court ascertained what values the 1934 Act seeks to promote by examining
which types of cases justify intervention by the Securities and Exchange Commission 1 4 and by examining the sections of the 1934
Act that express the standards for judging exchange rules."15 The
rule requiring arbitration was then measured against these
values:" 6 The Court concluded that any relation between the rule
and the value is " 'extremely attenuated and peripheral, if it exists

Holding Co. Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§
791-828c (1976)), specifically required that an applicant for a federal license comply
with state law. The Court based its decision on the veto power states would have
over federal projects if the applicant was required to comply with the state's
licensing provisions. The requirement that an applicant comply with state law was
held only applicable to areas not addressed by the federal legislation.

110. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
112. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
113. Id. at 130.
114. Id. at 127-30.
115. Id. at 130, 135. See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,

161-63 (1978) (utilizing method of analysis similar to that employed in Ware to conclude that Congress intended to establish uniform standards for ship seaworthiness);
First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1946)

(utilizing method of analysis similar to that employed in Ware to delineate areas of
federal and state responsibilities under Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063
(1920), as amended by Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838
(1935) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (1976)).

116. 414 U.S. at 135-36.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss3/6

20

1979]

ACCESS
MIGRANT-WORKER
Dinkoff: A
UnifiedTOTheory
of PreemptionCAMPS
and Access to Migrant-Worker Camps

at all.' "117 This conclusion is strengthened by the language of section 6, pursuant to which the NYSE regulation at issue was promulgated. Section 6 provides "for the expulsion, suspension, or
disciplining of a member 'for conduct or proceeding inconsistent
with just and equitable principles of trade.' "118 Thus, the Court
concluded that despite the apparent conflict between federal and
state mandates, the California statute need not yield to the NYSE
rule. This holding was based on the conclusion that enforcement of
the state statute would not subordinate any value protected by the
1934 Act. 119
Two seemingly inconsistent cases, Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit12 0 and Perez v. Campbell, 12 1 illustrate the Supreme
Court's focus on whether enforcement of state law subordinates
federally protected rights and values. Huron permitted enforcement of Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code against a ship licensed
by the federal government. The federal license was only issued
after inspectors determined that the ship conformed with federal
safety regulations.1 22 The Court found that Detroit's ordinance was
designed to protect the legitimate local concerns of public health
and the cleanliness of the community, 12 3 whereas the federal law
117.

Id. at 135 (quoting Amicus Brief of the United States at 9).

118. Id. at 134 n.13 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976)).
119. Id. at 134-36. In reaching this conclusion, the Court also found that national uniformity in this area is not a value the 1934 Act sought to further.
Preemption is, therefore, not mandated on those grounds. Id. at 136-39. See notes 93
& 97 supra and accompanying text. See also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974) (Ohio trade secrets statute does not conflict with federal patent legislation, despite earlier decisions invalidating unfair trade practice statutes, see, e.g.,
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.
173 (1942)). The Court distinguished unfair trade practice statutes on the ground that
they disturb the balance struck by federal patent laws between encouraging competition and encouraging invention. Unfair trade practice statutes protect inventions that
federal patent laws declare unpatentable and, therefore, in the public domain. Trade
secrets statutes, on the other hand, do not disturb the balance, since the inferior protections they provide do not discourage entry into the patent system, and they only
protect information not available to the public. The states, therefore, cannot provide
protections afforded or withheld by federal patent laws, but the states are free to
protect employers from industrial espionage and unethical conduct by employees.
416 U.S. at 484-93.
120. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
121. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
122. In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-42
(1963), the Court reiterated that possession of a federal license does not provide immunity from state regulation. Accord, Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379
(1963); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 207-09 (1944).
123. 362 U.S. at 442. This finding triggers two rebuttable presumptions: There
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was designed to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel.' 24 Since
the Court found that the boilers could comply with both federal
safety standards and local air pollution control standards, there was
no conflict between the local regulation and the purpose and effect
of the federal statute. The result would have been different if, for
example, the federal policy had been to promote the cheapest possible transportation of goods in interstate commerce, provided the
vessels meet minimum federal safety requirements. In such a case,
the supremacy clause precludes the state from subordinating the
federal value of cheap transportation to the state value of clean
air.' 25
Justice Douglas dissented in Huron, focusing, not on the values
and rights the federal law sought to further and protect, but on the
coincidence of the federal and local laws: both sought to regulate
the quality of the boiler. Since the federal government had licensed the same boiler that Detroit sought to subject to a higher
6 Howstandard, Justice Douglas found the two laws in conflict. 12
ever, as the majority pointed out, enforcement of the Smoke
Abatement Code would not subordinate any federal value to one of
7
the state.12
is a presumption that legislation is valid from a commerce clause perspective even
though it affects interstate commerce, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S.

520, 523-24 (1959); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 319-20
(1851), and there is a presumption against preemption when state interests are
"'deeply rooted in local feelings and responsibility,'" Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 195 (1978) (quoting San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)). See also Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144-45 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); note 85 supra.
124. 362 U.S. at 445.
125. Compare Public Utils. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958), with
United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv, Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1963). Both cases
invalidated state attempts to serve legitimate local needs that conflicted with a federal policy of procuring services at the lowest price. But see Penn Dairies, Inc. v.
Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943) (upholding local regulation of milk prices
that had effect of increasing minimum price at which Army could procure milk).
Penn Dairies was distinguished in Georgia Public Service Commission on the
ground that Congress had clarified its intent in the interim. 371 U.S. at 288.
126. 362 U.S. at 449-55 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 444-48. Accord, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v, San Diego County Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 207 (1978); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 139-40 (1973); International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853 (3d Cir.
1975). In Mariniello the Third Circuit upheld the right of a state to require a showing of good cause before a franchisor can refuse to renew a franchise. The court rejected the defendant's claim that the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976), as
amended by Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-410, 92 Stat. 888, gives him the right to absolute control over his trademark.
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Although the result in Huron differs from that in Perez v.
Campbell,'2 8 the analysis is the same in both cases. In Perez the
Court overruled two of its prior decisions' 2 9 and refused to permit
enforcement of an Arizona statute that suspended the driver's license of a judgment debtor when the judgment resulted from an
automobile accident and remained unsatisfied for sixty days. The license remained suspended until the judgment was satisfied,
irrespective of a discharge in bankruptcy under the Federal Bankruptcy Act.' 30 The Arizona courts explicitly declared the purpose of
the statute to be the protection of those using Arizona's highways
from judgment-proof drivers. ' 3 '
Dissenting in Perez, Justice Blackmun emphasized the legitimate and important state interest, 132 and the divergent purposes of
the statutes.133 This was the approach taken in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety' 3 4 and Reitz v. Mealey,13 5 the cases Perez
expressly overruled. Emphasizing the "complicated demands of our
federalism,' 1 6 the Court in Kesler focused on the widely divergent
purposes of the state statute and the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The
Court dismissed the argument that the statute is actually a device
for collecting debts discharged in bankruptcy. It was, the Court
said, within the traditional state police power to protect the life
"Where conflict is alleged between federal and state law, the specific purpose of the
federal act must be ascertained in order to assess any potential erosion of the federal
plan by operation of the state law." 511 F.2d at 858. The court found that the purpose of the Lanham Act is limited to protecting the public from deception and protecting the trademark holder's investment. It concluded that the state statute does
not undermine any of those purposes. Mariniello was followed in Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Nevada Real Estate Advisory Comm'n, 448 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (D.
Nev. 1978), affd mem., 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979). Cf. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 163-68 (1978) (invalidating state ship-safety regulations because they were
contrary to Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 46 U.S.C. § 391(a) (1976), which
establishes uniform national standard for design and construction of tankers).
128. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
129. Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), overruled, 402
U.S. 637 (1971); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), overruled, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 523).
131. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963). A similar statute existed in 44 states and the District of Columbia, and was part of the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. at 638, 665 &
n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. 402 U.S. at 657 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. 369 U.S. 153 (1962), overruled, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
135. 314 U.S. 33 (1941), overruled, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
136. 369 U.S. at 172.
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and limb of its citizens, and there was no'clear collision with a national law."' 13 7 The Court
apparently defined "clear collision" as
138

"conflicting purpose."' Huron can be read as establishing a dissimilar purpose/local interest test similar to that advanced by Justice Blackmun's Perez dissent. Under this formulation of the
preemption test, antipoverty programs would not preempt state
private-property statutes since the two statutes address unrelated
needs. However, the analysis in Huron focused on the effect
enforcing the state statute would have on federally protected
values.
The majority in Perez followed the analysis in Huron and held
that the absence of conflict between the purposes of the two statutes is irrelevant since a conflict exists between the operation of
39
the state statute and the purpose of the federal bankruptcy laws.1
The Court recognized that the state statute makes the state's policy
of protecting those who use its highways superior to the federal
policy of giving discharged "debtors 'a new opportunity in life and
a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.' "140 Therefore, the state policy
was required to yield. Kesler and Reitz were overruled because
both decisions failed to recognize that even though the federal and
state statutes sought unrelated purposes, and even though the state
statutes sought to protect important local concerns unaddressed by
federal legislation, their enforcement would necessarily subordinate
federally protected values.
Since only state action is preempted,' 4 ' the problem of what
constitutes state action must be addressed. This problem is made
particularly acute in a migrant-camp context by the absence of a
formal relationship between the grower and the state. The requi137. Id.
138. See id. at 172.
139. Accord, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker the Court upheld
enforcement of a California agricultural program even though some of the program's
goals were at odds with federal agricultural policy. The California statute was upheld
because the state had not yet acted contrary to federal policy. Id. at 355. See generally Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164 (1975). For a
more recent analysis of Parkerand its effect on federal antitrust laws and the Federal
Trade Commission Act, see Comment, The Parker Perplex: A Study of the Changing
Effects of Parker v. Brown on the Antitrust Laws and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 281 (1978).
140. 402 U.S. at 648 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934)).
141. This'is implicit in the definition of preemption. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
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site nexus, 142 therefore, appears to be absent in most cases.
Moreoever, the requirement of state action poses a threshold barrier: Without a finding of state action the court will not reach the
14 3
merits of the claim.
The state-action doctrine gives cognizance to the recognized
limitations on the Constitution, which, with the exception of the
thirteenth amendment,'"4 imposes standards of conduct only on
governments and leaves the actions of private individuals to the vicissitudes of social interaction.145 After years of expanding the definition of state action to the point where some commentators declared that there is no longer any meaningful legal distinction
between private and governmental action,' 4 6 the Supreme Court
has begun to restrict the scope of what constitutes state action and
to reestablish the right of private parties to act without conforming
their behavior to constitutional standards.' 4 7
The Supreme Court recently refused to find that private conduct was state action despite the state grant of the right to self
help, 1 4 8 the state grant of monopoly to a public utility with state
regulation of the monopoly's tariffs, 149 the licensing and regulation
of a private club by the state liquor authorities, 1 50 and the private
142. "[Tlhe inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). The nexus test announced in Jackson goes beyond the facts of the case. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Note, State
Action After Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.: Analytical Framework for a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DIcK. L. REV. 315 (1976). For an exhaustive treatment of state
action prior to Jackson, see Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional
Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974). The availability of a
company town rationale has been effectively foreclosed by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976). See text accompanying notes 63-68 supra.
143. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 359 (1974).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Restrictions on individuals' conduct are also
imposed by those sections of the Constitution that establish the qualifications for
holding elected federal positions. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. II, §
1. cl. 5.
145. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This doctrine has been upheld
as recently as Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
146. See, e.g., Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REV. 347
(1963).
147. See Basset, The Reemergence of the 'State Action' Requirement in Race
Relations Cases, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 39 (1972); Note, State Action and the Burger
Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974); text accompanying notes 148-151 infra.
148. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
149. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
150. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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ownership of the equivalent of a town's business district. 151 However, the issue is fundamentally different in a preemption context.
In nonpreemption cases, the state-action inquiry determines
whether the individual is free to choose how to act, or whether he
or she is required to conform to constitutional standards. The issue
is not the authority of the government to regulate conduct.1 52 The
issue in a preemption context is whether the state's creation of
certain rights subordinates federally protected values. The rule
established by the supremacy clause is that the state cannot make
the values it chooses to protect superior to those created by Congress. Therefore, while state creation of private-property rights is
not, by itself, sufficient state action to require a private-property
owner to conform his or her behavior to constitutional standards,' 53
it is sufficient state action to require the rights of private property
5 4
to yield to the values implicit in federal antipoverty legislation. 1
The distinction is based on the reasons for the state-action require55
ment.'1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
ACCESS THROUGH PREEMPTION

Preemption precludes states from enforcing their trespass or
private-property rules when enforcement would undermine the effectiveness of a federal antipoverty program. The test is not the
similarity between federal and state statutes, 156 but whether en151. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
152. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), considered the state-action doctrine, in part, a restriction on the ability of the federal government to legislate. This
function of the doctrine is no longer important given the Supreme Court's expansive

construction of the commerce clause. See Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (stat-

utes virtually identical to those in Civil Rights Cases enforced in virtually identical
fact situation). But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
which invalidated an act of Congress passed in reliance on commerce clause pow-

ers, because Congress exceeded its power to legislate when it impaired a state's ability to "'function effectively in a federal system,' " id. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).

153. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
154. See id. at 521-23. In Hudgens the Court ruled that although the union
members did not have a constitutional right to picket in the shopping center, the
right of union members to organize granted by Congress under § 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), may require private-property owners to
grant access. The Court remanded the case to the NLRB for findings on this issue.
424 U.S. at 521-23.
155. See text accompanying notes 145 & 152 supra.

156. The dissenters in Huron and Perez sought to adopt this test. Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 449-55 (1960)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). The relevance of divergent purposes is discussed at note
123 supra.
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forcement of state property laws subordinates federally protected
values. The supremacy clause of the Constitution does not allow
states to protect private-property rights at the expense of values
protected by federal legislation. The first inquiry, therefore, must
be into what values underlie the federal antipoverty legislation.
The Economic Opportunity Act, 15 7 under which the migrantworker programs are funded, 158 was enacted as part of President

157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-29961 (1976), as amended by Legal Services Corporation

Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-222, 91 Stat. 1619, and Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-568, 92 Stat. 2425.
158. Amended 42 U.S.C., supra note 2, §§ 2901-2906. The Act addresses what
the House committee report described as one of the most persistent problems in
American society, H.R. REP. No. 1458, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted in
[1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2900, 2923, by assisting "States, political sub-

divisions of States, public and nonprofit agencies, institutions, organizations, farm
associations, or individuals in establishing and operating programs of assistance to
migrant agricultural employees and their families," id. at 25, reprinted in [1964]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2924. The programs funded directly under Title IV are intended to supplement urban and rural community action programs
funded under Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2781-2797 (1976), as amended by Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-568, §§ 4, 17, 92 Stat. 2425, by focusing directly on the special needs of migrant workers and their families. The
uniqueness of the migrant-worker problem was reemphasized in 1978 when Congress removed the migrant-aid provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act from the
rural-poverty title and established a separate title for migrant-worker programs. See
note 2 supra. Amended 42 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 2901, which states the purpose of
Title IV, and id. § 2902, which sets out the programs to be funded by Title IV, provide as follows:
§ 2901. Statement of purpose
The purpose of this title is to assist migrant and seasonal farmworkers
and their families to improve their living conditions and develop skills necessary for a productive and self-sufficient life in an increasingly complex and
technological society.
§ 2902. Financial assistance
(a) The Director may provide financial assistance to assist State and local agencies, private nonprofit institutions, and cooperatives in developing
and carrying out programs to fulfill the purpose of this title.
(b) Programs assisted under this title may include projects or activities(1) to meet the immediate needs of migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their families, such as day care for children, education,
health services, improved housing and sanitation (including the provision and maintenance of emergency and temporary housing and sanitation facilities), legal advice and representation, and consumer training
and counseling;
(2) to promote increased community acceptance of migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their families; and
(3) to equip unskilled migrant and seasonal farmworkers and members of their families, as appropriate, through education and developmental programs to meet the changing demands in agricultural employment brought about by technological advancement and to take
advantage of opportunities available to improve their well-being and
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Johnson's comprehensive Great Society legislation designed to end
"'serious poverty in the midst of plenty."' 59 It grew out of a recognition of three realities:' 60 The desperate and shameful condition of
our nation's poor; the fragmentation and ineffectiveness of existing
federal programs; and the national scope of the problem. The Economic Opportunity Act seeks to provide a comprehensive program
to attack the multiple causes of poverty on a national scale' 61
through local efforts coordinated by the federal government. The
Act embodies the human values implicit in a desire to give the
poor of our Nation the tools to lead productive lives in a complex
society. 162 The legislation seeks to ensure the American ideal of
self-sufficiency by gaining regular or permanent employment or by
participating in available federally assisted employment or training programs.
159. 110 CONG. EEc. 16611 (1964) (remarks of Sen. McNamara, floor manager
of Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, opening Senate debate on bill),
160. See Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8,
1964), 1 PUB. PAPERS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1963-64, at 112, 113-14 (1965); Special Message to Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty
(Mar. 16, 1964), 1 PuB. PAPERS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1963-64, at 375, 375-80
(1965); H.R. REP. No. 1458, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2900, 2901-03; Economic Opportunity Act of 1964: Hearings on
H.R. 10440 Before the Subcomm. on the War on Poverty Program of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 26-27 (1964) (statement of
Walter W. Heller, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers) [hereinafter cited as
Economic Opportunity Act Hearings]; 110 CONG. REC. 16611-12 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. McNamara, floor manager of Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, opening Senate debate on bill). L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT 69-87 (1971); J. SUNDQUIST,
POLITICS AND POLICY 111-54 (1968).
161. Poverty is a national problem, requiring improved national organization and support. But this attack, to be effective, must also be organized at
the State and the local level and must be supported and directed by State
and local efforts.
But whatever the cause, our joint Federal-local effort must pursue poverty, pursue it wherever it exists-in city slums and small towns, in
sharecropper shacks or in migrant worker camps, on Indian Reservations,
among whites as well as the Negroes, among the young as well as the aged,
in the boom towns and in the depressed areas.
Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964), 1 PUB. PAPERS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1963-64, at 112, 114 (1965). See Economic Opportunity Act Hearings,supra note 160, at 181 (remarks of Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of HEW); id. (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen, ranking minority member); L.
JOHNSON, supra note 160, at 29.
162. See Special Message to Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the
Sources of Poverty (Mar. 16, 1964), 1 PUB. PAPERS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1963-64,
at 375, 376 (1965); S. REP. No. 71, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1967); H.R. REP. No.
1458, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2900, 2902; Economic Opportunity Act Hearings, supra note 160, at 20, 21 (state-
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equal opportunity.' 6 3 It recognizes the right of the poor to share in
the Nation's affluence and lead lives of dignity as fully participating
64
members of society. 1
Consistent with the federalism concerns which lie at the heart
of any preemption analysis, courts often have narrowly construed
the rights and values created by federal legislation in order to soften the impact on local authority. 16 5 This canon of construction,
used in areas other than preemption, is often referred to as the
"clear-statement requirement.' 166 It mandates that "unless Congress
conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance."' 167 This requirement
ment of R. Sargent Shriver, Director, Peace Corps, and Director-designate, Office of
Economic Opportunity).
163. "Unfortunately, many Americans live on the outskirts of hope-some because of their poverty, and some because of their color, and all too many because of
both. Our task is to help replace their despair with opportunity." Annual Message to
the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964), 1 PUB. PAPERS OF LYNDON B.

JOHNSON, 1963-64, at 112, 113-14 (1965); Special Message to Congress Proposing a
Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty (Mar. 16, 1964), 1 PUB. PAPERS OF
LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1963-64, at 375, 375-80 (1965); Economic Opportunity Act
Hearings, supra note 160, at 20, 25, 1510 (statement of R. Sargent Shriver, Director,
Peace Corps, and Director-designate, Office of Economic Opportunity); id. at 184,
192 (statement of W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor). The Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964 is a program "to provide the poor people of our Nation with the human
skills and resources with which they, themselves, will earn their rightful place in society." H.R. REP. No. 1458, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2900, 2902.

164. See H.R. REP. No. 1458, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprintedin [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2900, 2902. See Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 622
(W.D. Mich. 1971) (recognizing right of migrant workers to receive benefits provided
by Economic Opportunity Act programs). President Johnson wrote that he viewed
the Great Society legislation as
an extension of the Bill of Rights. When our fundamental American rights
were set forth by the Founding Fathers, they reflected the concerns of a
people who sought freedom in their time. But in our time a broadened concept of freedom requires that every American have the right to a healthy
body, a full education, a decent home, and the opportunity to develop to the
best of his talents.
L. JOHNSON, supra note 160, at 104.
165. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control
Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943). In Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912), the Court construed the Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, which was enacted "to
prevent adulteration and misbranding" of foods and drugs and to keep such articles
out of interstate commerce, 225 U.S. at 529, not to apply to disclosure or nondisclosure of ingredients and, therefore, not to preempt a state statute that required
all feeding stuffs for domestic animals to include ingredients on the labels.
166. See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 COLUm. L. REv. 527, 539-40 (1947).

167. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (citations omitted).
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arose to provide an additional check on expansion of federal power
at the expense of the states. 168 The emphasis is on congressional
action rather than judicial interpretation: The interests of the states
are represented in Congress; therefore, state sovereignty should
not be diminished unless the states consent in Congress to the
diminution of their prerogatives.' 6 9 The inevitable frictions caused
by the expansion of central authority are reduced by insisting that
the balance be struck in the forum where the potential losers in
the struggle have the most influence and the greatest opportunity
to structure the realignment of power. The clear-statement requirement ensures that Congress addresses a central issue of all federal
legislation: the correct balance between federal involvement and
state control.
While the clear-statement requirement might lead a court to
narrowly construe the Economic Opportunity Act and deny access,
the legislative history indicates that Congress squarely faced the
federalism questions and clearly defined the relationship between
the programs and the states. In so doing, Congress further clarified
the Act's underlying values.
The Act bypasses the states, the traditional conduits of federal
aid, and establishes a direct partnership between the federal government and the people of the local communities. 170 The House
report accompanying the legislation explains that "local citizens
know and understand their communities best and that they will be
the ones to seize the initiative and provide sustained, vigorous
leadership." 171 But the reasons for bypassing the states go deeper,
since the Act as originally proposed ignored elected community of72
ficials and permitted the establishment of private local agencies.1
These agencies were to receive direct federal funding. Opponents
of the bill feared this would undermine the viability of state and lo168. Id. at 349-50. See Frankfurter, supra note 166, at 539-40.
169. For a discussion of this requirement in the context of the eleventh amendment, see Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 682 (1976).
170. Economic Opportunity Act Hearings, supra note 160, at 20, 21 (statement
of R. Sargent Shriver, Director, Peace Corps, and Director-designate, Office of Economic Opportunity); see sources cited note 174 infra.
171. H.R. REP. No. 1458, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD, NEWS 2900, 2909.

172. Pub. L. No. 88-452, §§ 202-211, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2790-2815 (1976), as amended by Economic Opportunity Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-568, 92 Stat. 2425).
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cal governments.' 7 3 The bill's proponents, however, resisted efforts
to return the states to full partnership on the ground that it would
place the states between the poor and the programs established to
74
help them. 1
173. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 18305 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Clancy); id. at
18303 (remarks of Rep. Michel); id. at 18274 (remarks of Rep. Goodell); id. at
18273-74 (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen, opposition floor leader); id. (remarks of
Rep. Thompson).
Representative Frelinghuysen, ranking minority member of the Subcommittee
on Poverty Program and the House Committee on Education and Labor, the subcommittee and committee that considered the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and
opposition floor leader, delivered a stern warning concerning what he considered
dangerous implications of the bill for federal-state relations. Id. at 18210-11 (remarks
of Rep. Frelinghuysen, opposition floor leader). The following quotations are indicative of his remarks and the views of those who opposed the bill on federalism
grounds:
Finally, we must reject this bill because it is absolutely contrary to every
sound principle we have developed in the establishment of Federal relations with State and local government, and with private organizations and
individuals.
The real issue before us is whether we approve and endorse-in the
guise of a war on poverty or for any other reason-a massive, unbridled extension of Federal authority into the public and private affairs of every community in this country. We must decide whether or not to approve an extension of Federal Power with no semblance of meaningful responsibility,
direction, or participation by State and local government.
...When all its wordy provisions are reduced to a basic proposition, it
is that the power to make every decision, to approve every course of action,
to select every beneficiary, is left to a single, appointive Federal official.
What is the really new and different element in these two programs,
aside from the degree of Federal direction? It is the concept of Federal subvention of work done for private organizations. Which organization and what
kind of work? Any-I repeat-any nonprofit organization which is carrying
on "work in the public interest."
Id. (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen, opposition floor leader). See also id. at 16723
(remarks of Sen. Holland); id. at 16718-19 (remarks of Sen. Prouty, sponsor of amendments to add governor's veto). Commentators who examined the administration of
the Act demonstrated that this fear was justified. See Leach, The Federal Role"in the
War on Poverty Program, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 18, 27-32 (1966); Note, Participation of the Poor: Section 202(a)(3) Organizations Under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 75 YALE L.J. 599 (1966). The value to constitutional litigation of
statements made by opponents of a bill has been illustrated as recently as Quern v.
Jordan, 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979). In Quern, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
considered the silence of the opponents of a bill evidence that the bill was not intended to produce a radical transformation in eleventh amendment immunity. Id. at
1146. In contrast, when considering the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congress extensively debated the role of state and local governments in the new
antipoverty program.
174. See Economic Opportunity Act Hearings, supra note 160, 1539-40 (ex-
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The original bill was amended to reestablish the states as full
partners in the antipoverty program by giving each governor veto
power over programs established in his or her state. 75 While private agencies still received directed federal funding, the veto
power gave the governors leverage to influence and shape the programs established in their states. However, congressional proponents of direct federal funding have succeeded in gradually
increasing the immunity of the programs from interference by state
and local governments. The veto was modified the following year
in a series of close votes 1 76 to give the Director of the Community

Services Administration 177 authority to override the veto without
change between Rep. Bell and B. Sargent Shriver, Director, Peace Corps, and
Director-designate, Office of Economic Opportunity); id. at 213 (exchange between
Rep. Roosevelt and W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor); id. at 164-65 (exchange
between Rep. Frelinghuysen, ranking minority member, and Anthony J. Celebrezze,
Secretary of HEW); id. at 144-45 (exchange between Rep. Griffin and Secretary
Celebrezze); id. at 102 (exchange between Rep. Taft and R. Sargent Shriver); id. at
78 (exchange between Rep. Goodell and R. Sargent Shriver); 110 CONG. REc.
16765-67 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff); id. at 16719-20 (remarks of Sen. Clark),
175. 110 CONG. REC. 16741 (1964). The House accepted the Senate's version of
the bill. Id. at 18650. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, §
209(c), 78 Stat. 508.
176. The debate over repeal in 1965 mirrored the debate in 1964, see notes 173
& 174 supra and accompanying text. See 111 CONG. REc. 20663 (1965) (remarks of
Sen. Prouty, proposing amendment to retain veto); id. at 20661 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough in opposition to retention of veto); id. at 20658 (exchange between Sens.
Saltonstall, Fannin and Lausche); id. at 20656 (remarks of Sen. McNamara, floor
manager of bill); id. at 20655 (remarks of Sen. Javits outlining Administration's objections to veto); id. at 17931 (remarks of Rep. Quie for retention of veto); id. at 17930
(remarks of Rep. Ryan against veto); id. at 17929-30 (remarks of Rep. Olsen of
Montana against veto); id. at 17927 (remarks of Rep. Ford against veto); id. at 17923
(remarks of Rep. Ayres, sponsor of amendment to retain veto). Debate concerning
whether to abolish the veto also brought out evidence to support the fears of opponents of the veto. See id. at 20660-61 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough); id. at 20656 (remarks of Sen. McNamara, floor manager of bill); id. at 17929-30 (remarks of Rep.
Olsen of Montana); id. at 17927-28 (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Opponents of the veto
also expressed fear that the mere existence of the veto would allow governors to
shape programs in their states. Id. at 20656 (remarks of Sen. McNamara, floor manager of bill); id. at 17923 (remarks of Rep. Ayres, applauding leverage which veto
power gave governors to shape programs). The remarks of Senator Yarborough indicate that these fears were justified. Id. at 20660 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough). For
examples of votes on amendments to restore the veto, which had been deleted when
the bill was in committee, see id. at 21113 (amendment of Sen. Prouty defeated by
vote of 44 to 48); id. at 20664 (amendment of Sen. Fannin defeated by vote of 45
to 45).
177. The Director of the Community Services Administration is the successor
to the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, which has been disbanded.
42 U.S.C. § 2941(a) (1976).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss3/6

32

1979]

Dinkoff: AACCESS
UnifiedTO
Theory
of Preemption and
Access to Migrant-Worker Camps
MIGRANT-WORKER
CAMPS

cause.1 7 8 As modified in 1965, the Director's override powers did
not extend to vetoes of VISTA' 79 or Job Corps and Work Training
programs.' 8 0 Congress expressly rejected an amendment to give
state legislatures the power to override the governor's veto instead
of reposing this power with the Director of the Community Services Administration.' 8 ' Congress thus was concerned with any control over programs at the state or local level. The continued movement away from state control of federal antipoverty programs
indicates that Congress clearly intends that the programs be free
from state interference.
In 1967, the Act was amended to create community-action
agencies. 1 82 These agencies are charged with coordinating the diverse programs in their communities and mobilizing community resources to fight poverty.' i s The state may designate itself as an
agency, or it may appoint any political subdivision, nonprofit
agency, or a combination thereof.1' 4 However, the Director of the
Community Services Administration retains the power to designate
a private, nonprofit community-action agency if a state or political
subdivision refuses to establish one, or if the government community-action agency fails in its responsibilities to the poor in the
community.las The Director is given complete discretion and authority to bypass the government agency if he or she feels that action necessary to ensure that the poor of the community receive
the help to which they are entitled.'8 6 Moreover, the communityaction agencies are required to provide mechanisms for the poor of
87
the community to have input into the decisionmaking process.1
178. Id. § 2834. The veto power does not extend to assistance to institutions of
higher learning. Id.
179. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 603, 78 Stat. 508
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4951-5085 (1976)).
180. Id. §§ 101-116 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 911-929 (1976)).
181.

111 CONG. REc. 20669 (1965) (defeated by vote of 44 to 47).

182. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, 9
210-225, 81 Stat. 672.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2795 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 866, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
21-22, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2428, 2448; 113 CONG.

REC. 26543-44 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Clark, floor manager of bill, opening Senate
debate on amendments to Economic Opportunity Act).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2790(a) (1976).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2790(d) (1976), as amended by Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-568, § 9, 92 Stat. 2425.
186. Id.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2791(b) (1976), as amended by Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-568, § 9, 92 Stat. 2425.
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Thus, even though the responsibilities of state and local governments in the war on poverty have increased, Congress has retained
a direct partnership between the federal government and the poor
of each community.1 8 8 Congress has been unwilling to allow anything to interfere with this partnership or to prevent the poor from
getting the help Congress has provided.
CONCLUSION

The preemption cases are consistent if the vocabulary is particularized to reflect the actual analyses of the courts. While there
have been inconsistent decisions, often the product of failure to
look beyond the overly broad language of the cases, and a certain
amount of shifting to reflect changing notions of federalism, the
cases evidence a developing, unified doctrine of preemption applicable to a variety of situations. Preemption is an important tool for
regulating the dynamics of the federal system and preserving the
place of the states in that system.
In the migrant-camp context, preemption mandates that in a
conflict between the private-property rights of the growers and the
needs of the migrant workers, the scales should be tipped in favor
of the needs of the migrants. A court faced with a demand by a
federally funded antipoverty organization for injunctive relief from
a grower's denial of access should grant the injunction to the extent
access is necessary for the effective functioning of the program.
Congress made the effectiveness of the antipoverty program superior to the states' interests. The supremacy clause gives effect to
this intent, while minimizing the impact on the interests of the
states.
Allan David Dinkoff
188. See generally Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 232-36 (1947)
(series of amendments illuminating intent of Congress in preemption context);
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147-48, 1150 (8th Cir.
1971) (series of amendments illuminating intent of Congress in preemption context),

affd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
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